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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN 
ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE PREJUDICIALLY GRUESOME 
PHOTOGRAPHS OVER THE OBJECTION OF MR. BETHA 
A. THE PHOTOGRAPHS FAILED TO MEET THE THRESHOLD 
REQUIREMENT OF ESSENTIALITY 
B. THE PHOTOGRAPHS WERE MORE PREJUDICIAL THAN 
PROBATIVE 
[No Reply - Opening Brief & Oral Argument Sufficient] 
II. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY ALLOWED TESTIMONY 
OF THE DEFENDANT'S PRIOR CRIMINAL HISTORY 
In answering Appellant's Opening Brief, the State 
mischaracterizes the argument of Mr. Betha, misperceives the 
record and misapprehends the law. Perhaps, most egregious 
of those errors is the State's assertion that somehow Mr. 
Betha had either opened the door for the Court to permit 
evidence of his prior conviction to be admitted into 
evidence and/or that counsel for Mr. Betha somehow had 
invited the Court to rule as she had and to commit the 
error. (See Brief of Respondent at pages 37 and 38). The 
State errs in both assertions. 
This Court must recognize that when new defense counsel 
1 
Mr. Youngberg entered his appearance to defend Mr. Betha 
subsequent to the mistrial, the trial court had already 
ruled suppressing evidence of the theft conviction but 
allowing evidence of the rape conviction to be introduced. 
(R. 405-06). That ruling is contained in Appellant's 
Opening Brief at Addendum A. Despite that fact, Mr. 
Youngberg, on behalf of Mr. Betha, filed a motion in limine 
renewing the issue and asking to exclude all prior 
conviction evidence. He urged the Court to keep out all 
prior conviction evidence acknowledging his awareness of the 
Court's earlier order. (R. 427-28). 
Later, after hearing substantial testimony in the 
matter, but before Mr. Betha testified, the court conducted 
an in-chambers off the record discussion. The record 
subsequent to that in-chambers discussion reveals that the 
court indicated on the record her decision to further narrow 
her order in reference to the admission of the rape 
conviction.(R. 1386-96). See Opening Brief of Appellant at 
Addendum B. That record demonstrates that during the in-
chambers discussion counsel for Mr. Betha requested that the 
nature of the conviction should not be introduced and urged, 
perhaps, a minimum position that if the prior is introduced 
2 
as ordered by the court to that point that at least the 
substance or nature of that conviction could not be 
introduced. (R. 1386-1396). 
The court should not have allowed evidence of the prior 
rape conviction of Mr. Betha to be introduced under an 
appropriate analysis of Rule 609 and Rule 404. The fact 
counsel requested and persuaded the court to reconsider a 
relaxed position from her earlier ruling can in no way be 
considered as an invitation on the part of Mr. Betha to 
"invite" or "trick" the court into making an erroneous 
decision. The court had made its erroneous decision in the 
first place and counsel, in urging her to correct that 
decision, was able to persuade the court for a middle-of-
the-road position. That position was not the position 
requested initially or desired by Mr. Youngberg on behalf of 
Mr. Betha. To the extent the court's on-the-record 
discussion referencing the in-chambers discussion indicates 
that Mr. Youngberg requested that medium approach does not 
relieve the Court of its obligation to conduct a fair trial 
and to appropriately rule on the initial evidentiary issue, 
which to that point the court had not done. 
The State mis-cites Utah law in support of its claim of 
3 
invited error. At Brief of Respondent, page 40, the State 
relies on State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987), while 
providing the citation for State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 
(Utah 1993). State v. Dunn is most instructive on this 
question. Like our case, Dunn dealt with an issue regarding 
prior conviction evidence. Unlike our case, Dunn dealt with 
a trial court reversing itself during trial from its earlier 
pretrial ruling based on erroneous reliance on bad law cited 
by the defendant. Dunn had relied on the ruling he had 
erroneously received from the court and testified, only then 
to have the issue re-opened and his testimony impeached by 
the prior conviction.1 The Court stated the following: 
1
 Dunn claimed that the trial court committed reversible 
error in allowing the prosecution to question him about his prior 
conviction. Before trial, Dunn moved to suppress evidence of a 
California conviction for assault with a deadly weapon. The trial 
judge held a hearing on the motion and ruled from the bench. Dunn 
contends that the judge ruled that the prosecution could not 
adduce evidence of Dunn's prior conviction so long as Dunn did 
not introduce evidence of his own character. The State, on the 
other hand, contends that the judge barred the evidence of the 
prior conviction only from the prosecution's case-in-chief. 
The case went to trial without clarification of the ruling. 
During the defense's case-in-chief, several witnesses testified 
before Dunn took the stand. No character evidence was adduced. 
After Dunn finished testifying, the prosecutor asked that the 
judge allow the state to impeach Dunn by cross-examining him 
about the prior conviction. Dunn's trial counsel objected, 
arguing that the pretrial ruling precluded admission of the 
evidence. The judge, relying on statutory and case law authority 
that he apparently was not aware of at the time of the pretrial 
ruling, overruled the defense counsel's objection and allowed 
Dunn to be cross-examined about the prior conviction. Dunn, 850 
4 
We have held repeatedly that on appeal, a party cannot 
take advantage of an error committed at trial when 
that party led the trial court into committing the 
error. This rule, which is known as the "invited 
error" doctrine, has two principal purposes. First, it 
fortifies our long-established policy that the trial 
court should have the first opportunity to address the 
claim of error. Second, it discourages parties from 
intentionally misleading the trial court so as to 
preserve a hidden ground for reversal on appeal. 
In the instant case, Dunn's trial counsel moved to 
exclude the evidence of his prior conviction and 
apparently provided the trial court with citations to 
the authority on which the court based its pretrial 
ruling. However, contrary to Dunn's position before 
the trial judge, the law at the time clearly allowed 
evidence of prior convictions to be admitted for 
impeachment purposes without any restriction. Dunn's 
counsel's actions in making the motion in limine 
without informing the trial judge of the controlling 
law led the trial court into error. Therefore, Dunn is 
precluded from asserting that the pretrial ruling 
misled him into taking the stand. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1220-21 (citations omitted; footnote 
omitted). Contrary to the facts in Dunn, what occurred with 
Mr. Betha did not violate the "invited error" doctrine and 
its two principal purposes. Mr. Betha (1) did provide the 
court in the first instance with the opportunity to address 
the potential error, and (2) he asserted his claim of error, 
and still so insists, from the denial of his initial motion 
in limine to exclude all prior conviction evidence and 
P.2d at 1220-21 (footnote omitted). 
5 
claims no relief, or at the very least insufficient relief, 
from the reconsidered ruling of the court. Mr. Betha's 
renewed request to the court was not intentionally 
misleading to preserve a hidden ground to reverse, but 
rather was a position recognizing that conviction evidence 
is coming in and a limit should be placed on the information 
reaching the jury. No invited error occurred; only error 
occurred as contained within the argument. The court, not 
defense counsel is responsible for the error. 
The State next contends that since Mr. Betha only 
challenges the absence of Rule 609 analysis and not the 
application of the rule that it will not address the issue. 
Brief of Respondent at 40. Mr. Betha insists that the 
trial court failed to conduct an analysis of the State v. 
Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986), five factors or, as the 
State prefers, to apply those factors to the facts in the 
Betha case. Mr. Betha provides in his opening brief the 
necessary application of the facts in the case to the 
factors outlined in Banner. Brief of Appellant at 34-37. 
The trial court's recitation of key words in its original 
order (R. 405-06) is inadequate and incorrect as a matter of 
law. 
6 
Finally, the State urges the Court that, even if 
the trial court improperly admitted the evidence of the 
prior conviction, that error was harmless. The State 
believes that a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
result could not have occurred for Mr. Betha, see Brief of 
Respondent at page 41. The State errs in so urging. As 
noted in Appellant's Opening Brief, admission of prior 
conviction evidence is presumed prejudicial. State v. 
Saunders, 699 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985). Our Utah Supreme 
Court has recognized that permitting the jury to speculate 
as to this type of evidence prejudices the defendant and his 
constitutional right to a fair trial. The Court stated: 
The basis of these limitations on the admissibility of 
evidence of prior crimes is the tendency of a fact 
finder to convict the accused because of bad character 
rather than because he is shown to be guilty of the 
offenses charged. Because of this tendency, such 
evidence is presumed prejudicial and, absent a reason 
for the admission of the evidence other than to show 
criminal disposition, the evidence is excluded. 
Id. More to the point, the violation is constitutional in 
nature. The Saunders' Court examining the impact of other 
crimes evidence on a jury, albeit in a slightly different 
context of severing charges as opposed to convictions, 
reiterated from a long line of cases: 
7 
More relevant here are our decisions in State v. 
McCumber and State v. Gotfrey. In McCumber, we held 
that due process was violated by the joinder of five 
counts, including aggravated burglary, aggravated 
sexual assault, and attempted rape. We noted, "[W]ere 
the diverse counts of the information in question to be 
tried separately, evidence relating to each count would 
not be heard by the jury trying other counts; the 
evidence relating to the various alleged offenses is 
not 'mutually admissible.'" Similarly, in Gotfrey, we 
held the joinder of two rape charges arising from 
incidents several months apart and with different 
victims improper under our former statute, stating, 
[C]are must be taken that the statute is not misused to 
deprive an accused of a fair trial upon an offense by 
joining different offenses so that evidence concerning 
charges unrelated in time and nature, which would 
normally not be admissible upon a trial, could be 
admitted as to the multiple offenses in an effort to 
stigmatize the defendant and thus make it questionable 
that the jury would give a fair and dispassionate 
consideration to the evidence on the first charge. 
Id. at 742 (footnotes omitted; citations omitted)(emphasis 
added). 
The trial court's error allowing testimony of Mr. 
Betha's prior criminal history prejudiced his right to a fir 
trial. His case should be reversed and remanded for a new 
trial. 
III. THE COMBINATION OF ERRORS PREVENTED THE DEFENDANT 
FROM RECEIVING A FAIR TRIAL 
[No Reply - Opening Brief & Oral Argument Sufficient] 
8 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY 
SENTENCING MR. BETHA TO SEPARATE SENTENCES FOR BOTH 
AGGRAVATED BURGLARY AND THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE 
OF AGGRAVATED ASSAULT 
Mr. Betha only comments in reply of the State's answer 
to draw attention to the State's concluding paragraph 
contained within this point. See Brief of Respondent at 49. 
There the State claims three distinct aggravated assaults 
despite only having charged and convicted of one such count. 
Three failures exist in this analysis. First, the 
companion charge of Aggravated Burglary as well as the 
charges for Aggravated Sexual Assault and Aggravated 
Kidnapping each required their own elements in aggravation 
to which some of this evidence must have ascribed. 
Second, each suggested aggravated assault likewise met 
the criteria outlined in the charge of Aggravated Burglary 
making State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874 (Utah 1985), 
compellingly on point and not distinguishable as claimed by 
the State. When there are multiple ways of alleging 
offenses, you must "consider the evidence to determine 
whether that relationship existed between the specific 
variations of the crimes actually proved at the defendant's 
trial." Id. at 877. See Brief of Appellant at 39-42. 
9 
Finally, the ambiguities of the "could haves" as 
postulated by the State reinforce that uncertainty exists as 
to the route the jury may have taken to render the 
convictions. Accordingly, this offense is mere surplusage 
as indicated by the Court in State v. Hill, 674 P.2d 96, 97 
(Utah 1983). 
CONCLUSION 
For all or any of the foregoing reasons, Mr. Betha 
respectfully requests that his convictions be reversed and a 
new trial ordered. L/[ Jo 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this jf) ' day of January, 1998. 
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CERTIFICATION 
I hereby certify that I have caused eight copies of the 
foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant to be delivered to the 
Utah Court of Appeals, 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84102 and that two copies were 
delivered/mailed to the Office of the Attorney General, 
Criminal Appeals Division, Heber Wells Bldg., 160 East 300 
South, 6th floor, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114, this day 
of January, 1998. 
RICHARD G. UDAY 
DELIVERED by ^ _ _ this 
day of January, 1998. 
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